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774 Reviews 
NAOMI D. HIuRNARD, The King's Pardon for Homocide before A.D. 1307. Oxford, England: Clarendon 
Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. xiv, 894. $10.50. 
NAOMI D. Hurnard's The King's Pardon for Homicide before AD 1307 is significant 
and instructive for both legal and social historians. The author has painstakingly 
pieced together the available evidence from a variety of classes of mediaeval 
English public records to achieve a clear statement of the law of excusable homi- 
cide, i.e., non-felonious but requiring a royal pardon. She has lucidly presented 
the procedure which marks out the legal life story of persons deserving pardon, 
from the pardonable slaying to the formal proclamation of the king's peace. But 
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she has also accomplished much more. Through careful and generally sound use 
of her limited body of evidence, Miss Hurnard has described societal attitudes 
toward the law from the differing perspectives of the non-felonious slayer, the kin 
of the slain and the King. Her study of pardonable homicide proves a useful 
vehicle for at least a preliminary assessment of mediaeval Englishmen's knowl- 
edge of and trust in law and legal procedure. It also sheds light on their thirst for 
vengeance and capacity for compassion and on the royal goverment's concern for 
achieving a semblance of law and order. 
It is Miss Hurnard's view that, until 1294, when the king first began to grant 
pardons indiscriminately to felonious layers as well as to victims of circumstance 
in order to raise troops for his wars, the system of pardoning those who slew ac- 
cidentally, in self defense or through mental defect or mental deficiency was on 
the whole both rational and efficacious. Of course, some who received pardons 
should not have done so; some deserving them were hanged; a few so misunder- 
stood or mistrusted the law that they actually abjured the realm for an excusable 
homicide or for one which they had not committed but believed they were sus- 
pected of committing (meticulosi). By and large, however, juries rendered fair 
verdicts and the legal machinery worked reasonably rapidly to provide bail or 
pardon for the deserving. While the law set too narrow limits to some areas of 
pardonable homicide - self-defence, notably - juries gave slayers the benefit 
of the doubt in close cases. Henry III's piety led him to grant pardons rather too 
freely; but Edward I, until the 1290's, achieved a reasonable balance between the 
sometimes opposed objectives of deterrence and royal mercy. The last decade or 
so of Edward's reign was the beginning of the end. Miss Hurnard notes that the 
outpouring of pardons to nondeserving slayers may have been detrimental to law 
and order in the fourteenth century. Attempts to restrain the monarch in this 
policy failed despite a great public outcry. Miss Hurnard suggests that the treat- 
ment of the nondeserving may, after 1307, have altered the situation of the truly 
pardonable slayer. She can give no assurance that the relatively rational ordering 
of justice which she describes outlived the thirteenth century. 
Miss Hurnard's study is based upon her definitive research in the judicial and 
financial roles of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It may be doubted that a 
single extant case of pardonable homicide escaped her attention. Her chapter 
(Im) dealing with excuses for which pardons were granted and setting forth the 
border areas where liability was unclear and, therefore, accorded inconsistent 
judicial treatment is admirably clear. Miss Hurnard shows how the elements of 
the typical statement of self-defence merged from the questions which judges 
put to jurors. The defendant was said to have acted as a last resort, when all hope 
of escape had been cut off - usually by a physical impasse. Jurors had to make 
these points very carefully. The king screened the verdicts with care and refused 
to grant pardons where the circumstances, as recorded, were particularly suspi- 
cious. 
Accidental homicide was treated very casually. Pardons were granted regard- 
less of the defendant's negligence, so long as he had acted without malice. Assess- 
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ment of malice reveals interesting societal attitudes; a defendant who struck a
'friend' could not have 'intended' to do so; inebriation might excuse the defen- 
dant, in the jury's view. The king, of course, might ake a sterner view of such 
cases. Miss Hurnard argues that negligence was a factor in the thirteenth cen- 
tury. Certain classes of homicide where negligence was unlikely resulted in acquit- 
tal: "those for which the uncontrollable movements of beasts or natural forces 
could be blamed." The "largest group in which negligence was ruled out almost 
automatically consisted of riding, driving and ploughing accidents." As Miss 
Hurnard states, "[t]his was a very rough and ready way of discriminating be- 
tween accidental slayers who needed pardon and those who did not." 
The great majority of special verdicts were for self-defence and, as indicated, 
they tended to follow a pattern of formulistic responses. While Miss Hurnard sug- 
gests these verdicts often represented xaggerations ofthe truth, she argues that 
the degree of fact alteration was slight and occurred mainly in close cases. There 
was, in her view, no systematic nvention of facts in order to secure pardons for 
those who did not deserve them under the law. This is a most important point, 
one on which I believe she is probably wrong (see my article in this issue, pp. 669- 
694 above). In my view, there was from the very inception of the system Miss 
Hurnard describes a widespread societal attitude toward liability for homicide, 
which did not accord with the rules of the law: while these rules did not recognize 
a distinction between homicide through stealth and "sudden," but deliberate, 
homicide (which did not amount to self-defence), society generally condemned 
the former and excused the latter by acquitting the defendant or by alleging a
case of self-defence. 
If so, it may be necessary to reconsider the system of pardoning. We could not, 
for instance, safely conclude that the flight of men who were subsequently par- 
doned resulted from ignorance of the law rather than from wise caution. We might 
alter our perception of attempts by the victims' kin to appeal 'pardonables': 
where there had not in fact been pardonable circumstances, the kin must have 
been greatly frustrated by the practical impossibility ofexercising their eserved 
'right' to appeal those pardoned of the king's suit. Finally, what was the precise 
nature of the change in the king's policy in 1294 when he began to grant pardons, 
for military service, to the 'nondeserving'? Did he conceive of his policy as an in- 
novation or merely as an extension of one which trial juries had long sanctioned 
on their own? 
The argument which I have suggested iffers substantially from Miss Hur- 
nard's thesis but it does not destroy the value of her research. Her book stands, 
in many respects, as an important pioneering excursion into largely unexplored 
regions of English mediaeval social and legal history. If my view is correct, and 
if Miss Hurnard has mistaken the exact dimensions of the forest, o read her book 
is to live for a time among the trees, to see at first hand what few historians have 
described before. Miss Hurnard is at her best mapping the intricate routes which 
men followed either to escape the arms of the law or to obtain a royal pardon. Her 
mosaic of case histories gives her work a three-dimensional aspect which institu- 
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tional and doctrinal studies too often lack; indeed, these careful reconstructions of 
mediaeval lives constitute an important contribution to early English history. 
THOMAS A. GREEN 
The University of Michigan 
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.224 on Thu, 14 Nov 2013 15:22:23 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
